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III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Xhe Trial Court's Failure To Grant Brown's Motion To Continue Trial And 
Vacate Scheduling Order And Motion To Compel Prior To Deciding Chick-
Fil-A's Motion For Summary Judgment Are Properly Before This Court And 
Should Be Reviewed For An Abuse of Discretion. 
Chick-Fil-A argues that Brown did not properly preserve the issues as to the trial 
court's holding that her motion to continue trial and vacate scheduling order was moot 
and denial of her motion to compel discovery. These issues were raised to the trial courx. 
briefed by the parties and set for hearing. See: Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 
945 P.2d 125 at 129-130 (Utah App. 1997) (to preserve a substantive issue for appeal. 
a party must first raise the issue before the trial court, have the requisite legal authority 
to support the argument, and provide the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue's 
merit). As such, these issues are properly before this court for review. 
Pursuant to Rules 37 and 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Brown timely filed 
a motion to continue trial and motion to compel discovery. (R. 299-300; 325-327.) 
These motions were supported by memorandums of points and legal authorities and set 
for hearing along with Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment. (R. 232-252; R. 
304-324; 402-403.) The trial court heard argument on the motion to continue and the 
motion to compel at the same time it heard argument on the motion for summary 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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judgment. The [rial court refused to rule on Brown's motion to continue and motion to 
compel, bin rather granted summary judgment in favor of Chick-Fil-A. (Transcript of 
Hearing. P. 52. : As a matter of law. the trial court abused its discretion when it refused 
to rule on Brown's motion to compel and found that the motion to continue trial and 
\acaie scheduling order was moot. 
Rule 40ib>, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes the trial court to grant a 
continuance upo- good cause shown or as justice may require. In reviewing the trial 
court's decision, the appellate court should, "examine the reasonableness of the exercise 
of that discretion . . . [and] should not reverse the ruling of the trial court absent a 
showing that the latter abused its discretion." Bairas v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 375 at 377-
378 (Utah 1962). 
Brown presented the trial court with four (4) grounds for continuing the trial: 1) 
Chick-Fil-A failed and refused to answer discovery; 2) Because Chick-Fil-A frustrated m 
discovery, Brown was not able to fully investigate her claims; 3) Brown's counsel was ^ 
force to withdraw unexpectedly; and 4) Brown's new counsel had a conflicting trial | 
scheduled. Brown made the good cause showing necessary to justify continuation of the 
trial. See: Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) (when counsel has made j 
timely objections, given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial date changed . . . it [is] an abuse of discretion not to grant the continuance.) As 
such the trial court abused its discretion by not continuing the trial and wicaiing the 
scheduling order. 
At the same time. Brown filed a motion to compel discover) pursuant to Rule 
37(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The basis ot Brown's argument was that she first 
propounded interrogatories on August 26. 1996.' These interrogatories consisted of six 
(6) questions. (A. 1- 6.* Chick-Fii-A failed \o answer within thirty (30- days as is 
required by Rule 31, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon inquiry from Brown, Chick-
Fil-A indicated that it was in the process of answering the interrogatories and would 
forward the answers as soon as possible. Importantly, Chick-Fil-A never refused to 
answer these interrogatories. Chick-Fil-A finally answered Brown's interrogatories on 
March 24, 1997. (R. 168-173.) The answers provided were incomplete and non-
responsive. (A. 7-12.) As such, Chick-Fil-A did not fulfil its duty to respond to 
discovery and Brown moved to compel on April 14, 1997. (R. 325-327; 232-252.) 
Brown's first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents were 
served on Chick-Fil-A, Inc., a Georgia Corporation on October 30, 1995. (R. 19-20; 29-
30.) On February 9, 1996 Chris Glover dba Chick-Fil-A of Fashion Place was 
substituted as a defendant in lieu of Chick-Fil-A, Inc., a Georgia Corporation. (R. 48-
49.) Brown re-propounded her interrogatories and request for production to Chris Glover 
dba Chick-Fil-A on August 26, 1996. (R. 97-98.) 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It is a well established rule o( law that, ''[a] fdjefendant may not ignore with 
impunity the requirements of Rules 33 and 34. and the necessitv to respond within thirty 
(30) days." IV7, VV. Gardner v. Park West Village. ^6S P. 2d :;34 (Utah iv""7i (upholding 
the trial courts grant of summary judgment against the defendant for the defendant's 
failure to respond to discovery.) At the hearing before the trial court Chick-Fil-A 
erroneously argued, and the court erroneously held that Brown should have moved to 
compel discovery earlier. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chick-
Fil-A, given the pending motion to compel, was a clear abuse o\ discretion. 
The motion to continue trial and the motion to compel were properly before the 
trial court. They were properly briefed and scheduled for hearing. As such, these issues 
are properly before this court on appeal. The trial court abused its discretion by failing 
and refusing to rule on these motions and concluding that these motions were moot in 
light of its grant of summary judgment. As such, the trail court abused its discretion by 
not granting these motions. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(0 
Motion To Continue. 
In response to Chick-Fil-A1 s motion for summary judgment, Brown timely filed 
a motion for continuance pursuant to Rule 56(0, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, along 
with the supporting affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash. (R. 330-331; 393-396.). The trial 
4 
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court denied Brown's Rule 56(f) motion and proceeded to hear, and grant, Chick-Fi!-.Vs 
motion for summary judgment. 
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition. :he 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just. 
There arc two considerations for granting a continuance pursuant to Rule 56'M: 
First, was there sufficient discovery prior to the motion for summary judgment, are. if 
so, was it afforded an appropriate response0 Second, is the discover)7 sought by the party 
opposing summary judgment for purely speculative facts i.e., are they on a "fishing 
expedition'?" Cox v. Winters, 678 P. 2d 311 at 313-314 (Utah 1984). 
It is well established that, "when a party timely presents an affidavit under Rule 
56(f) . . . the trial court's discretion is invoked." Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 87^ P. 
2d 1241 at 1243 (Utah 1994). And, a trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for 
continuance will be reversed if it exceeds the limits of reasonability. Id. at 1243. 
The facts of this case establish that Brown commenced discovery prior to the 
discovery cut-off and that Chick-Fil-a did not "afford" it an appropriate response. The 
information Brown sought in this discovery was material to the issues raised in summary 
5 
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judgement. As such, the trial court's denial of Brown's Rule 56(f) motion f0r 
continuance 'when reviewed in light of the previously hied motion to continue trial and 
v.icaie scheduling order and motion to compel) exceeds the limits of reasonability and as 
such this court should reverse the summary judgment. 
1. Summary Judgment Was Improper Because Chick-Fil-A Had Not 
Completed The Outstanding Discovery And The Delay Precluded Brown 
From Fully Investigating Her Claims. 
Chick-Fil-A argues that all the requested discovery was provided well before the 
discovery cut-off and as such, the trial court properly concluded that Brown had adequate 
time to complete her discovery prior to summary judgment. This argument is Chick-Fil-
A's attempt to distract this court from the fact — clearly established in the record -- that 
Chick-Fil-A did not timely respond to interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents. And, when it did respond, its answers were incomplete and non-responsive. 
In its brief, Chick-Fil-A admits that there was "some delay" in responding to 
Brown's interrogatories. See: Brief of Appellees, P. 8. The delay was at least six (6) 
months.2 In fact, Chick-Fil-A answered the interrogatories on March 24, 1997 - one 
2
 Chick-Fil-A delayed answering the interrogatories for approximately seventeen (17) 
months from the time of fist service. See: Footnote 1. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-ek before filing its motion for summary judgment." (R. 168-173.) And, when Chiek-
Fil-A finally did respond, i-s answers were incomplete and nonresponsive.4 (A. 7-12.) 
Given that Chick-Fi!-A\s answers were incomplete and nonresponsive, it still 
argues that "discovery was complete." This inconsistency is obvious. How can one that 
does not comply with Rules 33 and 34, argue that discovery is complete? By definition, 
discovery cannot be complete if answers are not provided. Case law dictates that 
summarv judgment cannot be granted If discovery is incomplete. See; Cox v. Winters. 
678 P. 2d 311 at 314 (Utah 19 S 4 • (summary judgment is not proper before :he 
nonmoving party has carried the already-begun discovery to completion); Auerbach 's Inc. 
v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 at 377 (Utah 1977) (summary judgment is premature because 
the nonmoving party's discovery is not yet complete); Drysdayle v. Ford Motor Co., 947 
3It is interesting to note that the trial court never asked Chick-Fil-A to explain why-
its discovery responses were delayed or why the answers it ultimately provided were 
incomplete. 
4For example, Interrogatory No. 3 asks for the name, address and telephone number 
of the manager or crew chief who was in charge of the restaurant on premises on January 
18, 1994 between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Chick-Fil-A's answer, "[t]he identity of the 
manager or crew chief who was in charge of the restaurant on January 18, 1994 is 
unknown at this time." Similarly, Interrogatory No. 4 asks for the name, address and 
telephone number [of] all employees who distributed samples of chicken in the Fashion 
Place Mall between he hours of 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on January 18, 1994. Chick-
Fil-A's answer, "the identify of the employee who distributed samples of chicken is not 
known." 
7 
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P. 2d 678 at 680 (Utah 1997) (prior to the completion of discovery, it is difficult t 
ascertain whether the nonmoving party will be able to sustain its claims and as such 
summary judgment should be denied): and Pepper v. Zions First Sail Bank, S.A., 801 
P.2d 144 at 154 (Utah 1990) (summary judgment is premature since the nonmoving party *l 
might be able, through additional discovery, prove different theories of recovery.) ** 
Chick-Fi!-A sought to benefit from its non-compliance with the discovery rules i * in 5 
this case. Chick-Fil-A knew when it filed for summary judgment that its discovery 
responses were ncu complete. By granting summary judgment, the trial court sanctioned 
Chick-Fil-A \s non-compliance with the discovery rules. This clearly contravenes the * 
existing case law and the purpose of Rule 56(f)-
2. The Information Set Forth In The Affidavit In Support Of Rule 56(f)j 
Motion To Continue Was Material To Summary Judgment. 
Brown filed an affidavit setting forth the facts she needed to obtain from discovery| 
(R. 393-396.) These facts were material to the issues raised on summary judgment, 
such, the trail court abused its discretion by denying Brown's Rule 56(f) motion to 
continue and granting Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment. 
On appeal Chick-Fil-A argues that the trial court denied the Rule 56(f) motic 
because it found that none of the factual issues raised in the affidavit were matenal 
the summary judgment. Brief of Appellees, P. 12. The trial court did not make 
8 
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r Hine Rather, the trial court found that the information sought was discoverable and 
something that should have been provided. Transcript on Appeal, P. 8. The reason, the 
trial court did not grant the Rule 56(f) motion is because n concluded, 'it [Br. wr; 
wanted the information . . [she] had a lot of time to get it and that [she] did not pursue 
the remedies that were available to [her] ." Transcript on Appeal. P. 26. As is argued 
above, the trial court improper!}' sanctioned Chick-Fi!-A's misuse of the discovery 
process by denving the pending moiions, including the Rule :>0U; motion. 
Brown's theory ot recover)- in this case is thai the method of operation i.e.. 
offering samples of greasy chicken in the mall walkway, used by Chick-Fil-A was 
inherently dangerous. In order to advance this theory. Brown needed to talk with the 
employees that actually handed out the samples to learn how far into the mall they went, 
if they were instructed to approach mall patrons, how often chicken samples were seen 
on the floor, if they were instructed to clean the sampling area beyond the lease line, etc. 
Theses facts -- the facts necessary to establish the dangerous method of operation and to 
rebut summary judgment -- were not before the court. As such, the court could not 
assume they were true for the purposes of summary judgment. Rather, the trial court 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dimply dismissed the method of operation argument and granted summary judgment/ 
This constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
v . The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When It Determined That Th[g 
Case Was Indistinguishable From Schnuphase.* 
At the trial level Brown claimed that the method of operation Chick-Fil-A used to 
sample its food was inherently dangerous. Specifically. Brown argued that passing out 
samples of greasy chicken, on a toothpick, in a busy and crowded mail walkwav sealed 
a situation were it was reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties 
would create a dangerous condition. (Transcript of Appeal, 44-45.) As such. Brown 
argued that the controlling case was Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 
1992). And that it was for the trier of fact to determine the reasonableness of Chick-Fil-
A's method of operation. The trial court disregarded this argument and concluded, as 
a matter of law, that Schnuphase was the controlling case. As such, the trial court 
committed reversible error. 
The trial court reasoned, "it seems to me that what [Brown is] inviting as material 
genuine issue of fact has to do with how Chick-Fil-A was acting in handing out chicken, 
and it seems to me [Chick-Fil-A's] position is that it doesn't matter; handing out food 
is not inherently dangerous. Whatever the nature of the food is, the Supreme court is 
telling us that that is not the kind of activity that is going to create liability." Transcript 
of Appeal, P 48. 
^Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). 
10 
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There are two theories of recovery in slip-and-fall cases. The first involves 
"tuations where there is a temporary hazard within the store that was not created by the 
sioreowner. Under this iheorv. the injured party must establish that the storeowner knew, 
or in the exercise oi reasonable care, should have know ot the spill and had the 
opportunity the clean it up. 
The second theory o\ recovery is where the storeowner creates the dangerous 
condition. Under this theory, the injured parly does not need to establish notice since a 
storeowner is deemed to have notice oi the dangerous condition. Canfield at 1226. 
In particular, "where the storeowner chooses a method of operation where it is reasonable 
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition, an 
injured party need not prove either actual or constructive knowledge of the specific 
condition. Id. at 1226 citing De Weese v. J. C Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P. 
2d 898, 901 (1956). 
In Canfield. a grocery store instituted a specialized marketing practice -- they 
displayed lettuce in the same box it arrived in from the farm i.e., the "farmers' pack." 
Because the lettuce had not been trimmed, it was expectable that customers would remove 
the outer leaves to examine the lettuce prior to purchasing it and, it was expectable that 
11 
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some of the outer leaves would inadvertently end-up on the floor. It was not expected 
that the customer would throw the outer leaves of the lettuce on the floor. 
The grocer reasonably foresaw that the outer leaves would be removed and 
reasonably foresaw that some of these leaves would inadvertently fall to the floor. 
Knowing this, the grocer piaced empty boxes around the display where customers could 
dispose of these leaves. The trial court granted summary judgement for the grocery store 
because the injured part) had not established that the grocer had actual or constructive 
notice of the lettuce leave which caused her fall. 
Upon review, this Court reasoned: 
[W]here the storeowner's method of operation creates a situation where it 
is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create 
a dangerous condition, an injured party need not prove either actual or 
constructive knowledge of the specific condition. (Citations omitted). In 
this type of case, notice is satisfied as a matter of lav/ because the 
storeowner is deemed to be informed of the dangerous condition since it 
adopted the method of operation. (Emphasis added.) 
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, this Court held: 
Albertsons chose a method of displaying and offering lettuce for sale where it was 
expected that third parties would remove and discard the outer leaves from heads 
of lettuce they intended to purchase. It was reasonably foreseeable that under this 
method of operation some leaves would fall or be dropped on the floor by 
customers thereby creating a dangerous condition. 
Canfieldat 1226, 1227. 
12 
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Chick-Fil-A relies on Schnuphase and argues that this is a typical sampling "spill" 
case and that as such. Brown must establish that Chick-fil-A had noticed that this specific 
niece of chicken was on the ground. In Schnuphase a customer slipped on ice cream that 
had fallen near the deli section of the grocery store. The ice cream had been on the floor 
for two to four minutes before the fall. The trial court granted summary judgement (or 
the grocery store. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning: 
Schnuphase failed in provide evidence of the foreseeability of an inherently 
dangerous condition. . . . While we do not limit the second class of case-
to only those operations which are permanently employed, inherent 
dangerous and foreseeability remain essential elements of the claim. 
(Emphasis added) 
918 P.2d at 479. 
This is not the typical sampling case where the sampling takes place in a grocery 
"(Store and people are carrying their intended purchases around in a shopping cart. To the 
%Contrary -- in this case Chick-Fil-A selected method of operation where it went out into 
•^v a mall walkway to distributed chicken samples to shoppers. These shoppers were 
carrying their purchases -- their hands were occupied. Chick-Fil-A purposefully timed 
its sampling to coincide with the traffic at the mall - it placed an employee with greasy 
The essential element for method of operation claims is that the condition created 
py defendant is of such a character that defendant has or should have notice of the 
inherently dangerous condition. 
13 
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pieces of chicken on toothpicks in the mall walkway when the mall was its busiest. It 
was expectable that shoppers would sample the chicken in the mall walkway. And, more 
importantly, it was expectable that some o\ the chicken samples would be drop in the 
mall walkway creating a dangerous condition for all shoppers. In fact Chick-Fil-A's 
management was aware that spilled chicken, from the chicken sampling, ended up in the 
mall walkway during busy periods. (R. 333-3335.) The "spill" was not a temporary 
condition but rather a dangerous and foreseeable consequence of the method of operation 
Chick-Fil-A selected to market its product. As such, the facts presented in this case fall 
within the preview of Canfield. 
Accordingly, Brown did not need to establish that Chick-Fil-A had notice of the 
piece of chicken she fell on because, given the method of operation selected by Chick-Fil-
A, notice was satisfied as a matter of law. Thus, the remaining question was whether 
or not Chick-Fil-A's method of operation was reasonable. The determination of 
reasonableness lies within the providence of the jury and precludes summary judgment. 
De Weese at 901. 
The trial court erroneously concluded that this case was indistinguishable from 
Schnuphase - it used the wrong analysis and erroneously granted summary judgment. 
14 
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TVs court should reverse the grant of summary judgment and allow the jury to determine 
if Chick-Fil-A's method of operation was reasonable. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, Brown clearly preserved for review the trial court's ruling that her 
motion to continue trail and vacate scheduling order was moot and the denial of her 
motion to compel discovery. Chick-Fil-A did not address these issues at all. As has 
been argued above, the trial coun abused its discretion by failing and refusing to rule on 
these motions and concluding that these motions were moot in light of the pending motion 
for summary judgment. 
Before the trial court, Brown vigorously argued that discovery was incomplete due 
Chick-Fil-A's willful misuse of the rules. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the 
scovery, Brown presented the trial court with facts and a theory to support her claim 
preclude summary judgment. The trial court committed reversible error by 
disregarding these facts and granting summary judgment. As such, Brown requests that 
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this case be reversed and remanded and that her case be presented to the trier of fact. 
DATED this W. day of September, 1998. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant
 /-
NANCY A. MISMASH 
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West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (601) 966-S1I1 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f -
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 03 
T 
CATHERINE 
v. 
^rL^Yi^ 
CHRIS GLOVER dba CHICK-FIL-i 
OF FASHION PLACE, HAHN 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a California 
corporation dba HAHN COMPAN". 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 0? 
INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANT CHRIS GLOVER 
dba CEICK-FIL-A 
]ivil No. 950905823PI 
7udge 
Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, hereby demands that defendant answer, under oath and in 
writing, each interrogatory hereinafter set forth, and serve a 
sworn copy of such answers upon the undersigned within forty-five 
days after service hereof. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The word "person (s) " means all entities and, without 
limiting the generality of the forgoing, includes natural persons, 
joint owners, associations, companies, partnerships, joint 
ventures, corporations, trusts and estates; 
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2. The word "document(si" means all written, printed 
"eccrded or graphic matter, photographic matter or sound 
~eproduccions, however produced or reproduced, pertaining in any 
J. i - ^ _ W vJ _L '^ j. CD 
rate the full name and present :r last known residence and 
business address of such person or persons, and, if a natural 
his present or last known v:n title, and the name and 
-o^o-pf" ^" 
cation" when used with respect to a document or documents, means 
the date thereof, subject matter, name=s) of person(s) who wrote, 
signed, initialed, dictated or otherwise participated in the 
creation of the same, the name(s) of the addressee or addressees 
(if any), and the name(s) and address es) of each person or persons 
who have possession, custody or control of said document or 
documents. If any such document was, or in existence, but is no 
longer, in your possession, custody cr control state the date and 
manner of its deposition; 
5. The word "identify" when used with respect to a 
conversation means to state: 
a. The time of such conversation; 
b. The place of such conversation; 
2 
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c. The identity of each person who participated 
in or overheard such conversation; 
d. The substance of the conversation including 
w n o s a i d w h a t ; 
e. Whether any minutes, notes or memoranda >;ere 
kept, and if so, identify the custodian of 
such documents. 
6. The word "you" or "your" means the defendant:. If 
che defendant is a corporation, the words "you" or "your" shall 
include agents and all other persons acting or purporting :: a n en 
behalf of it or its predecessors, including all past or present 
employees exercising discretion, making policy and making decisions 
or participating in any function with respect to loans; 
7. The word "policy" means each rule, procedure, or 
directive, formal or informal, and each common understanding or 
course of conduct which was recognized as such by your employees or 
other persons acting on your behalf, which was in effect at any-
time during the period covered by these interrogatories; 
INSTRUCTIONS 
1. When interrogatories contain separately numbered or 
lettered paragraphs, each separately numbered or lettered paragraph 
should be treated separately and a separate response furnished. 
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If, in answerina these interroaatories or any
 of 
them, the party responding encounters any ambiguity in construi n9 
"rocrato: a definition or instruction relev 'ant to 
l U C ^  i. o ^  d _ 'O -L. / ie party shall set 
tne construction ran ice ma iter deemed "ambicruous" and set forth the cc 
chosen or used in answering the interrogatory. 
2 . If any information is requested by an interrogatory 
on a calendar year basis, and the defendant's fiscal year differs 
year basis, it will be acceptable to plaintiff to 
at statr.. identify the fiscal years involved, and supply the 
information requested on a fiscal year basis if the information is 
more readily available in that form. 
4. If the defendant exercises its option under Rule 
3 3 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to produce business 
records in lieu of responding to any interrogatory, the following -J 
procedure is to be followed: 
a. In response to each such interrogatory, defendant 
will explain why the burden of deriving or 
ascertaining the answer is substantially the same 
for the parties serving the interrogatories as for 
the party served, and then state the identity of 
the records containing the answer. 
b. In producing such records, defendant will produce 
such records separately and will designate the 
4 
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interrogatory or interrogatories to wnicn such 
record responds, as well as the identification of 
the filefs) from which the a- i i i i c . . ^ / . e : f ; 
a document or non-written communic 
privileged, include the statement 
or non-written communication, the 
and the basis for 
:iaimea cv aetenaant to oe 
:ument 
^ ^ '_, -_ L U i i 
a l i ' a j - a - . L i . i i be a continuing interrogate 
The event, at any later date, the defendant obtains any additional 
"facts, or forms any conclusions, opinions or contentions different 
jErom those set forth in their answers to such interrogatories; 
^defendant shall amend its answers to such interrogatories promptly 
Id sufficiently in advance of any trial to fully set forth such 
lifferences. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1.: Identify by name, address and 
&^HPosition a l i persons who assisted in answering these 
~"Interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2.: Identify by name, address and 
Bltion those employees working at Chick-Fil-A on January 18, 
ft"4-
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INTERROGATORY NO. 3 Identify bv name, addres. 
• pu I c. ^  r •"> "^ p^ numcer tne manaaer or crew c: 
'estaurant ana on oremises on January 
;no was 
^4 cecweei 
and 4:00 D.m 
CRROGATORY NO 
-CU 
teiepnone numoer a n employees wno Gist 
in uhe Fashion Place Mail between the h 
o . m. on u anu a ry _L ^  _^ ^? ^  -* 
• p.rR 
n . r- ^  ^ 
-t. J : -^  u a.m. 
caress and 
cf chicken 
.^ and 2:00 
• o • o *~\ r ' 
any recorded statement, made any written notes, filed any cype of 
incident report, or heen otherwise interviewed or contacted 
regarding the facts and circumstances of the accident to Catherine 
Brown which occurred on January 18, 1994 at Fashion Place Mali in 
Murray, Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 . : With respect to the employees 
identified in the preceding interrogatories, identify any employees 
who are no longer employed at Chick-Fil-A at the Fashion Place Mall 
in Murray, Utah. 0 
DATED this 2-7^ day of August, 1996. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By. /'^C4s\s**>t*l~7 Cis-PA 
"EDWARD T. WELLS 
i 
;/L 
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JOHN' R LUND (A4368) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office'Box 45000 
Salt Lake City. Utah 841-5 
Telephone (801)521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT !N AND FOR 
LAL f LARh COL NT": . S"i ATE OF L'TAH 
CATHERINE BROWN. 
P:a: 
vs. 
CHRIS GLOVER, d/b/a CHICK-FIL-A. 
INC. of FASHION PLACE. HAHN 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a California corporation 
d/b/a HAHN" COMPANY, 
Defendants 
D L F L N I) A N T ( H RIS G L O \" V. R d 1 •,; i 
CHICk-FIL-.VS ANSWER- TO 
PLAINT! EELS FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES (dated 8 22 Vo 
Civil No 950905823 PI 
Judee Wiiiiam B. Bohiina 
Defendants by and through their counsei of record, John R. Lund of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau hereby submits Defendant Chris Glover dba Chick-fil-A's .Answers to Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories (dated 8/22/96) as follows: 
.INTERROGATORY NO 1: Identify by name, address and position all persons who 
assisted in answering these interrogatories. 
ANSWER: Chris Glover and Defendant's counsel. 
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INTERROGATORY NO 2: Identify' by name, address and posi-ion those employees 
working a: Chick-Fil-A on January' 18, 1994 
ANSWER. See attached document designated as Exhibit AA" 
INTERROGATORY NO .? Identify by name, address and micwume number the 
manager or crew chief who was in charge of the restaurant and on premises on i.mumv ;>.. wm 
bet'.vecn 10.'JO am and 4'00 o m 
ANSWER: The identity of the manager or crew chief who v,as in charge cf the 
restaurant on January IS, 1994 is unknown at this time Refer to Exhibit "A" AT the At of a!! 
INTERROGATORY NO 4, Identity by name, audress and tcic::n,nc numcer ah. 
employees who distributed samples of chicken in the Fashion Place Mall between the hours of 
1 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on January IS. 1994. 
ANSWER: The identity of the employee who distributed samples of chicken is not 
known. 
INTERROGATORY NO 5: Identify by name, address, telephone number and title any 
Chick-Fil-A employee who has given any recorded statement, made any written notes, filed any 
type of incident report, or been otherwise interviewed or contacted regarding the facts and 
circumstances of the accident to Catherine Brown which occurred on January 13, 1994 at 
Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah. 
-2-
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A \ S \ V H R : Ob> A inroimaiion reciaested m tms interrogator.' is vaizue. 
ambiguous and not rea; 
contact auoc ;us P> 
|\Tr]^ii)(_:.,\..I:i^Al_' 
intcrreaater^, ideiva: 
Faslvon Place Ma!! in \< 
ANSW'IIR: Sec r 
•l. ln iatee to icac to the oiscoverv o< admissioie evioenc 
oi tr;a;. 
a. ;tn respect to toe epiPiovees ideptineO 
r crop-loved at Chick-Fd-A at 
DAM-IP : 
x 
Bv rv 
Chris Glover dra Chick-fii-A 
N 1135^ -0 CHICK:-'!!. , W S 
- J -
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TATF OF l/TAH 
('( )' "\"TY OF A 
VFRiFICATIO\: 
•j'^ 'T'.cs nre true e.r.-j. 1 
X • : - , \ i 
A/V. 
/ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in 
My Conrnis^c:: Expire; 
COSYWWSSH7 
My Ccnra Espfrai Jyn 15,2DQ0| 
40C15 7C0EsaSfc40SJCin' &410 
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EXHIBIT =A 
CHICK-FIL-A's EMPLOYEE SCHEDULE OF 1-18-04 
MIKE ABEL 
JUSTIN ABEL 
KAREN' ABEL 
DIANA ANCELL 
JASON ATTEBURY 
IAN CALL 
HEATHER FAIRBOLRN 
HOLLY FAIRBOL'RN 
JON FOLEY 
MICHAEL FOLEY 
LISA HAYWARD 
LANE HIGLEY 
MICHELLE KEIRA 
JAKE LEIKAM 
~LAURA LEON 
[CHELLE SHELAEH 
IE PINBOROUGH 
. iNITA RAMIREZ 
IRADEN ROWLEY 
,ISA RUBBELKE 
JRETT SEAMONS 
^MY SWENSON 
SOPHIE TURNER 
INDYN WOOD 
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A£EJTjLA_viT_QF_SJiRViCE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT L.-\K.i 
ss. 
Heather Y. Obray. being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law or'fices e: 
Snow, Christensen A: Martineau. attorneys for Defendants herein: that she served the attach 
DEFENDANT CHRIS GLOVER dba CII1CK-FIL-.VS ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES (dated S .22 96) 'Ca.se Ncr.oer 95 = ^ 05325 Pi. 71 
Judicial District Court to: Salt La!\e Countvi upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Albert W. Gray, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
3575 South Market Street, #206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid on this J H < ^ j day of March. 
1997. 
i^ikCx. ^ C u J K 
Lj-teather Y\ Orjrav / \ 
7 •-' 7^ ~— SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ . day of March. 1997. 
XJ. 7s^/TMy± 
NOTARY PUlBLlC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
r-
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